Who's Afraid of Sunlight? Explaining Opposition to Transparency in Economic Development

被引:7
作者
Jensen, Nathan M. [1 ]
Thrall, Calvin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Govt, Austin, TX 78712 USA
关键词
Economic development incentives; transparency; clawback; recapture; public records request; FIELD EXPERIMENT; TAX INCENTIVES; FREEDOM; DISCLOSURE; CITIZENS; SUNSHINE; SECTOR; LAWS;
D O I
10.1017/bap.2021.8
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Firms and governments often negotiate economic development deals, such as tax abatements, with limited transparency, using exceptions to public records laws or other strategies for nondisclosure. In this article we explore the motivations of firms for keeping economic development deals out of the public eye. We explore legal challenges to public records requests for deal-specific, company-specific participation in a state economic development incentive program. By examining applications for participation in a major state economic program, the Texas Enterprise Fund, we find that a company is more likely to challenge a formal public records request if it has renegotiated the terms of the award to reduce its job-creation obligations. We interpret this as companies challenging transparency when they have avoided being penalized for noncompliance by engaging in nonpublic renegotiations. These results provide evidence regarding those conditions that prompt firms to challenge transparency and illustrate some of the limitations of safeguards such as clawbacks (or incentive-recapture provisions) when such reforms aren't coupled with robust transparency mechanisms. We speculate that the main motivation for these challenges is to limit scrutiny of these deals that could lead to backlashes against future economic development agreements.
引用
收藏
页码:474 / 491
页数:18
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