CEO Compensation

被引：281
作者：
Frydman, Carola [1 ]
Jenter, Dirk [2 ]
机构：
[1] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
来源：
ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, VOL 2 | 2010年 / 2卷
关键词：
executive compensation; managerial incentives; incentive compensation; equity compensation; option compensation; corporate governance; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; STOCK OPTION AWARDS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; INCENTIVE CONTRACTS; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; EQUITY INCENTIVES; FIRM PERFORMANCE; AGENCY PROBLEMS; BONUS SCHEMES; UNITED-STATES;
D O I：
10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper surveys, the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research.
引用
收藏
页码：75 / 102
页数：28
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