How agency conflict between family managers and family owners affects performance in wholly family-owned firms: A generational perspective

被引：40
作者：
Blanco-Mazagatos, Virginia [1 ]
de Quevedo-Puente, Esther [1 ]
Delgado-Garcia, Juan Bautista [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Burgos, Dept Econ & Adm Empresas, Fac CC EE & Empresariales, C Parralillos S-N, Burgos 09001, Spain
来源：
JOURNAL OF FAMILY BUSINESS STRATEGY | 2016年 / 7卷 / 03期
关键词：
Family firm; Agency theory; Family managers; Family owners; Governance mechanisms; Generational stage; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; STEWARDSHIP THEORY; ALTRUISM; CONSEQUENCES; SHAREHOLDERS; INVOLVEMENT; SUCCESSION; DISPERSION; DIRECTORS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jfbs.2016.07.003
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This study analyses the effects of agency conflict between "active family owners" (who participate in firm management) and "passive family owners" (who do not do so) on the performance in unlisted Spanish family firms wholly owned by family members. We employ agency theory to argue that ownership concentration by active family owners and governance mechanisms (direct control by passive family owners, existence of board of directors, and family governance mechanisms) improve the firm performance and that this effect intensifies in later-generation firms. Our findings show that family managers' ownership and family governance mechanisms have a positive influence on the performance in second- and later-generation firms. The results also show a positive effect of direct control by passive family owners over active family owners in second- and later-generation firms. However, the existence of a board of directors is not related to family firms' performance. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：167 / 177
页数：11
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