Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close US House Races, 1942-2008

被引:197
作者
Caughey, Devin
Sekhon, Jasjeet S. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Travers Dept Polit Sci, Dept Stat, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Ctr Causal Inference, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Program Evaluat, Inst Govt Studies, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
ESTIMATING INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE; OF-REPRESENTATIVES; ECONOMIC OUTCOMES; PARTIES MATTER; PARTISANSHIP; INVESTMENTS; TURNOUT; EXAMPLE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1093/pan/mpr032
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Following David Lee's pioneering work, numerous scholars have applied the regression discontinuity (RD) design to popular elections. Contrary to the assumptions of RD, however, we show that bare winners and bare losers in U.S. House elections (1942-2008) differ markedly on pretreatment covariates. Bare winners possess large ex ante financial, experience, and incumbency advantages over their opponents and are usually the candidates predicted to win by Congressional Quarterly's pre-election ratings. Covariate imbalance actually worsens in the closest House elections. National partisan tides help explain these patterns. Previous works have missed this imbalance because they rely excessively on model-based extrapolation. We present evidence suggesting that sorting in close House elections is due mainly to activities on or before Election Day rather than postelection recounts or other manipulation. The sorting is so strong that it is impossible to achieve covariate balance between matched treated and control observations, making covariate adjustment a dubious enterprise. Although RD is problematic for postwar House elections, this example does highlight the design's advantages over alternatives: RD's assumptions are clear and weaker than model-based alternatives, and their implications are empirically testable.
引用
收藏
页码:385 / 408
页数:24
相关论文
共 99 条
[1]  
ALBOUY D, 2009, 15224 NAT BUR EC RES
[2]  
Alvarez R. Michael, 2010, OXFORD HDB AM ELECTI, P219
[3]  
Angrist JD, 2009, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICISTS COMPANION, P1
[4]   The Credibility Revolution in Empirical Economics: How Better Research Design is Taking the Con out of Econometrics [J].
Angrist, Joshua D. ;
Pischke, Joern-Steffen .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 2010, 24 (02) :3-30
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2002, ELBRIDGE GERRYS SALA
[6]  
[Anonymous], THIS IS NOT FLORIDA
[7]  
[Anonymous], 2002, Springer Series in Statistics
[8]  
[Anonymous], 1999, DEMOCRACY ACCOUNTABI
[9]   Soft money, hard money, strong parties [J].
Ansolabehere, S ;
Snyder, JM .
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, 2000, 100 (03) :598-619
[10]  
Ansolabehere Stephen, 2004, LEGISLATIVE STUDIES, V29, P488