Price Versus Quantity Competition in a Vertically Related Market with Retailer's Effort

被引：4
作者：
Liu, Qian [2 ]
Wang, Leonard F. S. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Wenlan Sch Business, 182 Nanhu Ave,East Lake High Tech Dev Zone, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China
[2] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Int Serv Econ Res Inst, Guangzhou, Peoples R China
来源：
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2022年 / 22卷 / 01期
关键词：
Cournot; Bertrand; vertically-related market; decentralized bargaining; promotional effort; DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY; BERTRAND; COURNOT; MANUFACTURERS; EFFICIENCY; INFERENCE; OLIGOPOLY; PRODUCT; CHOICE;
D O I：
10.1515/bejte-2020-0036
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Allowing downstream retailers to engage in demand-enhancing investment, this paper demonstrates that the classical conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition in a vertically related market with decentralized bargaining are completely reversed. It shows that Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition, in the sense that both consumer surplus and social welfare are always higher in the former.
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页码：51 / 66
页数：16
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