A comprehensive analysis of package tour quality: A stochastic evolutionary game

被引：8
作者：
Lv, Wan-Qing [1 ]
Wang, Yi-Jie [1 ]
Su, Ching-Hui [2 ]
Chen, Ming-Hsiang [3 ,4 ,5 ]
Kot, Hung Wan [6 ]
机构：
[1] Yunnan Univ, Sch Business & Tourism Management, Dept Tourism Management, Kunming 650500, Yunnan, Peoples R China
[2] Iowa State Univ, Dept Apparel Events & Hospitality Management, Ames, IA 50011 USA
[3] Nanjing Xiaozhuang Univ, Tourism & Social Adm Coll, Nanjing 211171, Peoples R China
[4] Washington State Univ, Sch Hospitality Business Management, Carson Coll Business, Pullman, WA 99164 USA
[5] Beijing Sport Univ, Sch Recreat Sports & Tourism, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
[6] Univ Macau, Fac Business Adm, Dept Finance & Business Econ, Ave Univ, Taipa, Macao, Peoples R China
来源：
TOURISM MANAGEMENT | 2022年 / 91卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Package tour quality; Asymmetric information; Stochastic evolutionary game; Lemon market theory; Compound relief mechanism; Wright -Fisher process; MORAL HAZARD; SOCIAL MEDIA; DYNAMICS; MARKET; INFORMATION; CONSUMER; STRATEGIES; REPUTATION; LEMONS; LOGIC;
D O I：
10.1016/j.tourman.2021.104478
中图分类号：
X [环境科学、安全科学];
学科分类号：
08 ; 0830 ;
摘要：
This study sheds light on the shaping and evolution of package tour supply strategies by examining package tour quality variance under various information conditions using evolutionary game and stochastic processes. The findings indicate that demand elasticity is critical in package tours' quality when the market information is symmetric. In an asymmetric information tourism market, adverse selection and moral hazard are the primary causes of degraded package tour quality. This study develops a compound relief mechanism comprised of stratification, reputation, and punishment mechanisms to address issues with the quality of package tours. The compound relief mechanism can assist policymakers in developing practical market regulations and policies by providing a theoretical basis for package tour quality control.
引用
收藏
页数：18
相关论文
共 65 条
1234567