The Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses

This paper examines the standard Bayesian solution to the Quine-Duhem problem, the problem of distributing blame between a theory and its auxiliary hypotheses in the aftermath of a failed prediction. The standard solution, I argue, begs the question against those who claim that the problem has no solution. I then provide an alternative Bayesian solution that is not question-begging and that turns out to have some interesting and desirable properties not possessed by the standard solution. This solution opens the way to a satisfying treatment of a problem concerning ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses. 1 Introduction 2 The standard Bayesian solution to the Quine-Duhem problem 2.1 The Bayesian theory of confirmation 2.2 Bayesianism and the Quine-Duhem problem 2.3 Questioning the first assumption 2.4 Questioning the second assumption 2.5 Objectivity again 3 Refuting evidence 4 Confirming and disconfirming evidence 5 Beyond the Quine-Duhem problem 6 Ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses.