Authoritarian transparency: China's missing cases in court disclosure

被引:17
作者
Liu, Zhuang [1 ]
Wong, T. J. [2 ]
Yi, Yang [3 ]
Zhang, Tianyu [4 ]
机构
[1] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Southern Calif, Los Angeles, CA 90007 USA
[3] Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Chengdu, Peoples R China
[4] Chinese Univ Hong Kong, Shenzhen Finance Inst, Shenzhen, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Transparency; Corporate litigation; Disclosure bias; SOE; Home court; CORRUPTION; QUALITY; PROTEST;
D O I
10.1016/j.jce.2021.09.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The question whether authoritarian regimes use transparency initiatives to improve public governance or only to perform window dressing remains open. To address it, we examine a recently promulgated transparency policy in China that mandates public access to all judicial opinions. We find that local courts fail to disclose more than 60% of their opinions in corporate litigation cases, measured against a baseline of publicly listed firms' disclosure of their litigation, as required and enforced by the securities regulations. Instead of upholding judicial fairness, local courts disclose cases selectively, displaying favoritism and responding to private incentives. Courts are more likely to suppress the publication of their opinions when the firm involved in the litigation is state-owned or is the defendant in its home court, especially in the year before the promotion of the provincial party secretary. We also find that firms whose cases are disclosed by the courts undergo adverse economic consequences, signaling that they have fallen out of favor with the government.
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 239
页数:19
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