Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games

被引：48
作者：
Treich, Nicolas [1 ]
机构：
[1] LERNA INRA, Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
来源：
PUBLIC CHOICE | 2010年 / 145卷 / 3-4期
关键词：
Risk-aversion; Rent-seeking; Lobbying; Uncertainty; Prudence; Self-protection; BEHAVIOR;
D O I：
10.1007/s11127-009-9569-x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent Under n = 2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model
引用
收藏
页码：339 / 349
页数：11
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