Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games

被引：49

作者：

Treich, Nicolas ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] LERNA INRA, Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 2010年 / 145卷 / 3-4期

关键词：

Risk-aversion; Rent-seeking; Lobbying; Uncertainty; Prudence; Self-protection; BEHAVIOR;

D O I：

10.1007/s11127-009-9569-x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent Under n = 2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model

引用

页码：339 / 349

页数：11

共 33 条

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