Adversarial and inquisitorial procedures in arbitration

被引:101
作者
Shin, HS [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford Nuffield Coll, Oxford OX1 1NF, England
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2555894
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
How should a dispute be settled between tw opposing parties The adversarial procedure invites the parties to make their cases to an impartial arbitrator while the inquisitorial procedure requires the arbitrator to adjudicate on the basis of his own investigations. Even if it is assumed that the arbitrator is, on average, as well informed as the two opposing parties, the adversarial procedure is shown to be strictly superior. This superiority stems from the ability within the adversarial procedure to allocate the burden of proof in an effective manner, and thereby extract the maximal informational content from apparently inconclusive contests.
引用
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页码:378 / 405
页数:28
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