Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Squashing Using Depth-3 Arithmetic Circuits

被引:83
作者
Gentry, Craig
Halevi, Shai
机构
来源
2011 IEEE 52ND ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE (FOCS 2011) | 2011年
关键词
KEY;
D O I
10.1109/FOCS.2011.94
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We describe a new approach for constructing fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes. Previous FHE schemes all use the same blueprint from [Gentry 2009]: First construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme, next "squash" the decryption circuit until it is simple enough to be handled within the homomorphic capacity of the SWHE scheme, and finally "bootstrap" to get a FHE scheme. In all existing schemes, the squashing technique induces an additional assumption: that the sparse subset sum problem (SSSP) is hard. Our new approach constructs FHE as a hybrid of a SWHE and a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption (MHE) scheme, such as Elgamal. Our construction eliminates the need for the squashing step, and thereby also removes the need to assume the SSSP is hard. We describe a few concrete instantiations of the new method, including a "simple" FHE scheme where we replace SSSP with Decision Diffie-Hellman, an optimization of the simple scheme that let us "compress" the FHE ciphertext into a single Elgamal ciphertext(!), and a scheme whose security can be (quantumly) reduced to the approximate ideal-SIVP. We stress that the new approach still relies on bootstrapping, but it shows how to bootstrap without having to "squash" the decryption circuit. The main technique is to express the decryption function of SWHE schemes as a depth-3 (Sigma Pi Sigma) arithmetic circuit of a particular form. When evaluating this circuit homomorphically (as needed for bootstrapping), we temporarily switch to a MHE scheme, such as Elgamal, to handle the Pi part. Due to the special form of the circuit, the switch to the MHE scheme can be done without having to evaluate anything homomorphically. We then translate the result back to the SWHE scheme by homomorphically evaluating the decryption function of the MHE scheme. Using our method, the SWHE scheme only needs to be capable of evaluating the MHE scheme's decryption function, not its own decryption function. We thereby avoid the circularity that necessitated squashing in the original blueprint.
引用
收藏
页码:107 / 116
页数:10
相关论文
共 17 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1990, Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, Volume A: Algorithms and Complexity
[2]  
BRAKERSKI Z, 2011, LECT NOTES COMPUTER
[3]   A PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM AND A SIGNATURE SCHEME BASED ON DISCRETE LOGARITHMS [J].
ELGAMAL, T .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, 1985, 31 (04) :469-472
[4]  
Gentry C., 2009, FULLY HOMOMORPHIC EN, V20
[5]  
Gentry C, 2011, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V6632, P129, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_9
[6]  
Gentry C, 2010, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V6223, P116, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-14623-7_7
[7]   Fully Homomorphic Encryption Using Ideal Lattices [J].
Gentry, Craig .
STOC'09: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING, 2009, :169-178
[8]  
Goldreich O, 1997, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V1294, P112
[9]  
KLIVANS AR, 2006, FOCS, P553
[10]  
Nisan N, 1997, COMPUT COMPLEX, V6, P217