Self-selection in education with matching frictions

被引：28

作者：

Charlot, O

Decreuse, B

机构：

[1] Univ Mediterranee, GREQAM, F-13002 Marseille, France

[2] Univ Paris, CNRS, EUREQua, F-75647 Paris, France

来源：

LABOUR ECONOMICS | 2005年 / 12卷 / 02期

关键词：

matching frictions; education; heterogeneity; efficiency;

D O I：

10.1016/j.labeco.2003.11.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the efficiency of educational choices in a two-sector/two-schooling level matching model of the labour market where a continuum of heterogenous workers allocates itself between sectors depending on their decision to invest in education. We show that self-selection in education is inefficient, and overeducation takes place. Too many workers are willing to acquire education, as they do not internalize the impact of their education decision on the others' wage and employment perspectives. (c) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：251 / 267

页数：17

共 26 条

[1] A microfoundation for social increasing returns in human capital accumulation [J].