Do soccer players play the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium?

被引:33
作者
Azar, Ofer H. [1 ]
Bar-Eli, Michael [1 ]
机构
[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Business Adm, Guilford Glazer Sch Business & Management, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
关键词
STRICTLY COMPETITIVE GAMES; MATCHING-PENNIES GAME; MINIMAX HYPOTHESIS; PENALTY KICKS; FOOTBALL; UNIQUE; MARKET;
D O I
10.1080/00036841003670747
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) is a commonly used solution concept in game-theoretic models in various fields in economics, management and other disciplines, but the experimental results whether the MSNE predicts well actual play in games is mixed. Consequently, the evidence for naturally occurring games in which the MSNE predicts the outcome well is of great importance, as it can justify the vast use of MSNE in models. The game between the kicker and the goalkeeper in soccer penalty kicks is a real-world game that can be used to examine the application of the MSNE concept or its accuracy, because payoffs are a common knowledge, the players have huge incentives to play correctly, the game is simple enough to analyse, its Nash equilibrium is in mixed strategies, and players' actions can be observed. We collected and analysed the data on the direction of kicks and jumps in penalty kicks in various top leagues and tournaments. Our analysis suggests that the MSNE predictions are the closest to the actual sample data, even though some other prediction methods use information on the marginal distribution of kicks or jumps, whereas the MSNE does not.
引用
收藏
页码:3591 / 3601
页数:11
相关论文
共 27 条
[1]   Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks [J].
Bar-Eli, Michael ;
Azar, Ofer H. ;
Ritov, Ilana ;
Keidar-Levin, Yael ;
Schein, Galit .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 2007, 28 (05) :606-621
[2]   TESTING THE MINIMAX HYPOTHESIS - A REEXAMINATION OF ONEILL GAME EXPERIMENT [J].
BROWN, JN ;
ROSENTHAL, RW .
ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (05) :1065-1081
[3]   SUBJECTIVE RANDOMIZATION IN 1-PERSON AND 2-PERSON GAMES [J].
BUDESCU, DV ;
RAPOPORT, A .
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING, 1994, 7 (04) :261-278
[4]   Testing mixed-strategy equilibria when players are heterogeneous: The case of penalty kicks in soccer [J].
Chiappori, PA ;
Levitt, S ;
Groseclose, T .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2002, 92 (04) :1138-1151
[5]  
Erev I, 1998, AM ECON REV, V88, P848
[6]   Sentiment in the betting market on Spanish football [J].
Forrest, David ;
Simmons, Robert .
APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2008, 40 (01) :119-126
[7]   Large sport events and unemployment: the case of the 2006 soccer World Cup in Germany [J].
Hagn, Florian ;
Maennig, Wolfgang .
APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2009, 41 (25) :3295-3302
[8]   Reconsidering the impact of national soccer results on the FTSE 100 [J].
Klein, Christian ;
Zwergel, Bernhard ;
Fock, J. Henning .
APPLIED ECONOMICS, 2009, 41 (25) :3287-3294
[9]   An experimental study of information and mixed-strategy play in the three-person matching-pennies game [J].
McCabe, KA ;
Mukherji, A ;
Runkle, DE .
ECONOMIC THEORY, 2000, 15 (02) :421-462
[10]   Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games [J].
Mookherjee, D ;
Sopher, B .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1997, 19 (01) :97-132