The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games With Anonymous Random Matching

被引：11

作者：

Deb, Joyee ^{[1
]}

Sugaya, Takuo ^{[2
]}

Wolitzky, Alexander ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Yale Univ, Yale Sch Management, New Haven, CT 06520 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford Grad Sch Business, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

[3] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 2020年 / 88卷 / 03期

关键词：

Repeated games; random matching; folk theorem; SOCIAL NORMS; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; COMMUNICATION; COOPERATION; EQUILIBRIA; EVOLUTION; PAYOFFS; MONEY;

D O I：

10.3982/ECTA16680

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove the folk theorem for discounted repeated games with anonymous random matching. We allow non-uniform matching, include asymmetric payoffs, and place no restrictions on the stage game other than full dimensionality. No record-keeping or communication devices-including cheap talk communication and public randomization-are necessary.

引用

页码：917 / 964

页数：48

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