Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation

被引：20

作者：

Agrawal, Anup ^{[1
]}

Nasser, Tareque ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Alabama, Culverhouse Coll Business, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 USA

[2] Kansas State Univ, Coll Business Adm, 2097 BB,1301 Lovers Lane, Manhattan, KS 66506 USA

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 2019年 / 9卷 / 03期

关键词：

Boards of directors; blockholders; executive compensation; CEO turnover; firm valuation; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES; VENTURE CAPITALISTS; MATCHING ESTIMATORS; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; PROPENSITY SCORE; DIRECTORS; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; STOCK;

D O I：

10.1142/S2010139219500101

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that firms with IDBs have lower excess CEO pay, lower flow and stock of CEO equity incentives, and higher valuations. These effects are substantial and robust. Our findings imply that by making it easier for blockholders to obtain a board seat, proxy access rules or bylaws can benefit shareholders.

引用

页数：67

共 50 条

[1] Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland
Slomka-Golebiowska, Agnieszka
Urbanek, Piotr
EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW, 2016, 28 : 203 - 220
[2] Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover
Aghamolla, Cyrus
Hashimoto, Tadashi
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2021, 59 (02) : 437 - 486
[3] Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover
Blackwell D.W.
Dudney D.M.
Farrell K.A.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2007, 29 (3) : 315 - 338
[4] A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover
Chemmanur, Thomas J.
Fedaseyeu, Viktar
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2018, 64 (10) : 4798 - 4817
[5] The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation
Ahern, Kenneth R.
Dittmar, Amy K.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2012, 127 (01) : 137 - 197
[6] Information transfer of CEO turnover: Evidence from firm-CEO mismatch
Desir, Rosemond
Seavey, Scott E.
Thevenot, Maya
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2024, 84
[7] Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world
Correa, Ricardo
Lel, Ugur
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2016, 122 (03) : 500 - 520
[8] Institutional change of compensation policy and its impact on CEO turnover and firm performance
Yin, Chenli
Li, Dan
Paz Salmador, Maria
REVIEW OF MANAGERIAL SCIENCE, 2022, 16 (08) : 2527 - 2552
[9] CEO Compensation and Unobserved Firm Performance in Pakistan
Sheikh, Muhammad Fayyaz
Bhutta, Aamir Inam
Sultan, Jahanzaib
JOURNAL OF ASIAN FINANCE ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS, 2019, 6 (03): : 305 - 313
[10] Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation*
Fahlenbrach, Ruediger
REVIEW OF FINANCE, 2009, 13 (01) : 81 - 113

← 1 2 3 4 5 →