共 32 条
The effect of CEO power on bank risk: Do boards and institutional investors matter?
被引:34
作者:
Altunbas, Yener
[1
]
Thornton, John
[2
]
Uymaz, Yurtsev
[3
]
机构:
[1] Bangor Univ, Business Sch, Coll Rd, Bangor LL57 2DG, Gwynedd, Wales
[2] US Dept Treasury, Off Tech Assistance, 1750 Penn Ave NW, Washington, DC 20006 USA
[3] Univ East Anglia, Norwich Business Sch, Norwich Res Pk, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
关键词:
Banks;
Governance;
Risk;
CEO power;
Boards of directors;
Institutional investors;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
PANEL-DATA;
CRISIS;
IMPACT;
D O I:
10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.020
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
We test for a link between CEO power and risk taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.
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页数:8
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