Challenges in Future Competition of Electric Vehicle Charging Management and Solutions

被引:26
作者
Xu, N. Z. [1 ]
Chung, C. Y. [2 ]
机构
[1] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Dept Elect Engn, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Saskatchewan, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A9, Canada
关键词
Aggregator; correlated equilibrium; demandside management (DSM); electric vehicle (EV) charging; mechanism design; Nash equilibrium; price of anarchy (PoA); DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT; MECHANISM DESIGN; GAME;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2014.2373401
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
In the foreseeable future, power grids will be managed largely with demand-side management (DSM) programs. With the growing population of electric vehicles (EVs) and the emergence of aggregators, DSM will surely introduce more intense competition to the markets. Since EV charging produces a large amount of time-flexible load in power systems, competition of its management could become a major game. This paper first formulates the game of EV charging management to describe this major form of the future DSM competition and then studies three challenges inherent in it: 1) inefficiency of Nash equilibria; 2) the game of chicken; and 3) cheating on private information. It is found that a central regulator is required to prevent these drawbacks. Solutions are proposed and a central governing procedure is also presented. The notion of the game of EV charging management is compatible with DSM programs that are able to schedule load flexibly over multiple time periods.
引用
收藏
页码:1323 / 1331
页数:9
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