Learning Hedonic Games

被引：0

作者：

Sliwinski, Jakub ^{[1
]}

Zick, Yair ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Natl Univ Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE | 2017年

关键词：

STABLE PARTITIONS; CORE; STABILITY;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

Coalitional stability in hedonic games has usually been considered in the setting where agent preferences are fully known. We consider the setting where agent preferences are unknown; we lay the theoretical foundations for studying the interplay between coalitional stability and (PAC) learning in hedonic games. We introduce the notion of PAC stability - the equivalent of core stability under uncertainty - and examine the PAC stabilizability and learnability of several popular classes of hedonic games.

引用

页码：2730 / 2736

页数：7

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