Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: a reply to DePoe

被引：11

作者：

Huemer, Michael ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Colorado, Dept Philosophy, Boulder, CO 80309 USA

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES | 2011年 / 156卷 / 01期

关键词：

Internalism; Phenomenal conservatism; Self-defeat;

D O I：

10.1007/s11098-010-9584-2

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.

引用

页码：1 / 13

页数：13

共 17 条

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