Effects of anti-corruption on firm performance: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

被引:61
作者
Kong, Dongmin [1 ]
Wang, Li [1 ]
Wang, Maobin [2 ]
机构
[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ, Luoyu Rd 1037, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China
[2] Univ Int Business & Econ, Sch Banking & Finance, Beijing, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Corruption; Central inspection teams; Quasi-natural experiment; Firm performance; GOVERNMENT; GROWTH;
D O I
10.1016/j.frl.2017.05.011
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the causal effects of anti-corruption on firm performance based on a quasi-natural experiment. Since 2013, China has implemented a national anti-corruption policy, and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has conducted five rounds of inspection on corruption covering all provinces. Difference-in-differences estimations show that although the anti-corruption campaign significantly improves firm performance of central state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such endeavor significantly reduces firm performance of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Thus, the corruption could a double-edged sword and act as "sand-the-wheel" in central SOEs but "greasing-the-wheel" in non-SOEs. This paper provides critical insights and a serious challenge for regulators in China. (c) 2017 Published by Elsevier Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:190 / 195
页数:6
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