The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols

被引:191
作者
Almeida, Heitor [1 ]
Park, Sang Yong [2 ]
Subrahmanyam, Marti G. [3 ]
Wolfenzon, Daniel [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
[2] Yonsei Univ, Seoul 120749, South Korea
[3] NYU, New York, NY 10003 USA
[4] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
Business groups; Family firms; Pyramids; Cross-shareholdings; Tunneling; Mergers and acquisitions; EMERGING MARKETS; FIRM VALUE; OWNERSHIP; GOVERNANCE; SEPARATION; FAMILY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.017
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study the evolution of Korean chaebols (business groups) using ownership data. Chaebols grow vertically (as pyramids) when the controlling family uses well-established group firms ("central firms") to acquire firms with low pledgeable income and high acquisition premiums. Chaebols grow horizontally (through direct ownership) when the family acquires firms with high pledgeable income and low acquisition premiums. Central firms trade at a relative discount, due to shareholders' anticipation of value-destroying acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with the selection of firms into different positions in the chaebol and ascribes the underperformance of pyramidal firms to a selection effect rather than tunneling. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:447 / 475
页数:29
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