Systematic longevity risk: to bear or to insure?

被引:8
作者
Boon, Ling-Ni [1 ]
Briere, Marie [2 ,3 ,4 ,6 ]
Werker, Bas J. M. [5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Aegon, Aegonpl 50, NL-2591 TV The Hague, Netherlands
[2] Amundi, 91 Blvd Pasteur, F-75015 Paris, France
[3] PSL Res Univ, Univ Paris Dauphine, Pl Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny, F-75775 Paris 16, France
[4] Univ Libre Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels Sch Econ & Management, Ctr Emile Bernheim, Ave FD Roosevelt 50,CP 145-1, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
[5] Netspar, POB 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[6] Tilburg Univ, POB 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
Group Self-Annuitization (GSA); insurance; longevity risk; variable annuity; PORTFOLIO CHOICE; STOCHASTIC MORTALITY; LIFE-INSURANCE; LEE-CARTER; ANNUITIES; MODEL; CONSUMPTION; STRATEGIES; MANAGEMENT; SELECTION;
D O I
10.1017/S1474747219000192
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We compare two contracts for managing systematic longevity risk in retirement: a collective arrangement that distributes the risk among participants, and a market-provided annuity contract. We evaluate the contracts' appeal with respect to the retiree's welfare, and the viability of the market solution through the financial reward to the annuity provider's equityholders. We find that individuals prefer to bear the risk under a collective arrangement than to insure it with a life insurers' annuity contract subject to insolvency risk (albeit small). Under realistic capital provision hypotheses, the annuity provider is incapable of adequately compensating its equityholders for bearing systematic longevity risk.
引用
收藏
页码:409 / 441
页数:33
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