Broad or Narrow Stakeholder Management? A Signaling Theory Perspective

被引:38
|
作者
Fu, Limin [1 ]
Boehe, Dirk M. [2 ]
Orlitzky, Marc O. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Newcastle, Business Sch, Hunter St & Auckland St, Newcastle, NSW 2300, Australia
[2] Univ Warsaw, Fac Management, Warsaw, Poland
关键词
corporate social performance (CSP); corporate social responsibility (CSR); environmental; social; and governance (ESG) performance; signaling theory; stakeholder management; CORPORATE SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE; RISK-MANAGEMENT; COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE; INSTITUTIONAL THEORY; MEDIA COVERAGE; CSR; REPUTATION; PRESSURES; SALIENCE;
D O I
10.1177/00076503211053018
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
To mitigate risk, should companies signal a broad range of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) initiatives or instead focus on only a few ESG issues? Drawing on signaling theory, we propose that a broad array of ESG initiatives generates not only signal consistency but also accelerating signal costs. Our empirical results support the resultant hypothesis of a curvilinear relationship between ESG scope and equity risk. In addition, this U-shaped curve seems to become steeper when firms face multiple media-reported ESG controversies. Overall, our study qualifies the conventional wisdom that firms can reduce equity risk by attending to a wide variety of stakeholders and highlights the moderating (signal-amplifying) impact of the firm's media environment.
引用
收藏
页码:1838 / 1880
页数:43
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