An Efficient Method for Localization of Magnetic Field Sources That Produce High-Frequency Side-Channel Emanations

被引:1
作者
Werner, Frank T. [1 ]
Dinkic, Jelena [2 ]
Olcan, Dragan [2 ]
Djordjevic, Antonije [2 ]
Prvulovic, Milos [3 ]
Zajic, Alenka [1 ]
机构
[1] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Elect & Comp Engn, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
[2] Univ Belgrade, Sch Elect Engn, Belgrade 11120, Serbia
[3] Georgia Inst Technol, Sch Comp Sci, Atlanta, GA 30332 USA
关键词
Probes; Frequency measurement; Time measurement; Position measurement; Magnetic shielding; Magnetic noise; Security; Electromagnetic emanation security and integrity; electromagnetic information leakage; electromagnetic side channels; localization of magnetic field sources;
D O I
10.1109/TEMC.2021.3063657
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
Presented is a new, low-cost system for locating the strongest sources of high-frequency EM side-channel emanations on PCBs. These sources indicate the best locations to monitor or mitigate the leakage. The challenges inherent in both side-channel and high-frequency measurements are addressed through careful design of the measurement and localization system. The system is time efficient, requiring only measurements taken around the edge of the device. Instead of testing specific cryptographic programs, this system focuses on identifying and then measuring the side-channel sources of the basic instructions that are commonly used by a multitude of programs on the device. The accuracy of the measurement setup was verified by comparing measurements with simulated results. The setup was then used to locate the instruction-dependent sources at 1 GHz on an field-programable gate array (FPGA) development board and an Internet-of-Things device. The 1 GHz sources are compared to previously identified sources on the same devices taken at significantly lower frequencies. The results demonstrate that the sources of the EM side channel can vary not only with the executed instruction, but also with the frequency of the side-channel signal.
引用
收藏
页码:1799 / 1811
页数:13
相关论文
共 43 条
  • [1] Agrawal D, 2002, LECT NOTES COMPUT SC, V2523, P29
  • [2] Trojan detection using IC fingerprinting
    Agrawal, Dakshi
    Baktir, Selcuk
    Karakoyunlu, Deniz
    Rohatgi, Pankaj
    Sunar, Berk
    [J]. 2007 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY, PROCEEDINGS, 2007, : 296 - +
  • [3] Ahmed MM, 2017, CSI INT SYMP COMPUT, P12, DOI 10.1109/CESYS.2017.8321253
  • [4] Alam M, 2018, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 27TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM, P585
  • [5] [Anonymous], 2012, DE1 DEV ED BOARD
  • [6] [Anonymous], 2013, A13 OL MICR
  • [7] [Anonymous], 2016, SMA 4 4 HOL PAN REC
  • [8] [Anonymous], 2015, C RAM SFC 4
  • [9] Backes M., 2010, USENIX SECURITY S, P307
  • [10] FASE: Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emanations
    Callan, Robert
    Zajic, Alenka
    Prvulovic, Milos
    [J]. 2015 ACM/IEEE 42ND ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (ISCA), 2015, : 592 - 603