AN ADVERSE SELECTION APPROACH TO POWER PRICING

被引：11

作者：

Alasseur, Clemente ^{[1
,2
]}

Ekeland, Ivar ^{[3
,4
]}

Elie, Romuald ^{[5
]}

Santibanez, Nicolas Hernandez ^{[6
]}

Possamai, Dylan ^{[7
]}

机构：

[1] EDF R&D, Paris, France

[2] FIME, Lab Finance Marches Energie, Paris, France

[3] Univ Paris 09, PSL Res Univ, CNRS, CEREMADE, Paris, France

[4] Inst Finance, Paris, France

[5] Univ Paris Est Marne la Vallee, Paris, France

[6] Univ Michigan, Dept Math, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[7] Columbia Univ, IEOR Dept, New York, NY 10027 USA

来源：

SIAM JOURNAL ON CONTROL AND OPTIMIZATION | 2020年 / 58卷 / 02期

关键词：

electricity pricing; contract theory; adverse selection; calculus of variations; power management; u-convexity; RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS; ELECTRICITY; PARTICIPATION; INCENTIVES; RESPOND; PEAK;

D O I：

10.1137/19M1260578

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

We study the optimal design of electricity contracts among a population of consumers with different needs. This question is tackled within the framework of Principal-Agent problems in the presence of adverse selection. The particular features of electricity induce an unusual structure on the production cost, with no decreasing return to scale. We are nevertheless able to provide an explicit solution for the problem at hand. The optimal contracts are either linear or polynomial with respect to the consumption. Whenever the outside options offered by competitors are not uniform among the different type of consumers, we exhibit situations where the electricity provider should contract with consumers with either low or high appetite for electricity.

引用

页码：686 / 713

页数：28

共 36 条

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