Cross-Evaluation Cost Allocation for Vehicle Routing Games

In this paper, we study a cost allocation problem that arises in goods distribution by vehicles. This problem can be formulated as a vehicle-routing game (VRG), where the total distribution cost must be divided among all customers visited by the vehicles. We apply our recently developed solution concept for cooperative games; cross-evaluation value; to the cost allocation. In the solution concept; the allocation of the total cost of a VRG among its players is based on self-evaluation and peer-evaluations of the cost contribution of each player to the grand coalition; subject to the core constraints when the core of the game is not empty. Since the vehicle-routing game may have an empty core, an extended core concept is also proposed for the game. and the cross-evaluation value is then applied to its cost allocation. Numerical examples are presented and discussed. (C) 2016, IFAC (International Federation of Antomatic Control) Hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.