Non-collaborative emission targets joining and quantity flow decisions in a Stackelberg setting

被引：15

作者：

Konur, Dincer ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Missouri Univ Sci & Technol, Engn Management & Syst Engn, Rolla, MO USA

来源：

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW | 2017年 / 105卷

关键词：

Emission target; Non-collaborative; Stackelberg; Quantity flow; Game theory; VENDOR-MANAGED INVENTORY; MAKE-TO-ORDER; CONSUMER ENVIRONMENTAL AWARENESS; SUSTAINABLE SUPPLIER SELECTION; LOT-SIZING PROBLEM; CARBON EMISSION; CHANNEL COORDINATION; CHAIN COORDINATION; GREEN; TRANSPORTATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.tre.2017.06.010

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This study considers a Stackelberg channel, where the leader determines the quantity flow along the channel. Both the leader and the follower have emission targets and the leader should respect those targets. In this setting, the leader and the follower can join their emission targets to lower costs while ensuring that the channel emissions do not exceed the cumulative target. The decisions for joining targets define a non-collaborative game between the leader and the follower. We characterize the equilibrium of this game. Furthermore, we analyze the effects of channel leadership. A manufacturer-retailer scenario is used to demonstrate the model. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：60 / 82

页数：23

共 106 条

[1] The single-item green lot-sizing problem with fixed carbon emissions [J].