Bank ownership structure, regulations and risk-taking: evidence from commercial banks in Pakistan

被引:20
作者
Ehsan, Sobia [1 ]
Javid, Attiya Yasmin [2 ]
机构
[1] NUST, Business Sch, H-12, Islamabad, Pakistan
[2] PIDE, Dept Econ, Islamabad, Pakistan
关键词
Corporate governance; Banks; Ownership structure; Risk; Regulation; CORPORATE-CONTROL; PANEL-DATA; GOVERNANCE; INDUSTRY; PERFORMANCE; BEHAVIOR; ESTIMATORS; MODELS; FIRM;
D O I
10.1007/s10258-018-0147-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of the theories concerning the influence of ownership structure on bank risk-taking in the presence of regulations in Pakistan. The sample used in this paper comprises a panel data of 26 banks in Pakistan, for the period from 2000 to 2014. The analysis provides evidence that increase in ownership concentration leads to an increase in bank risk-taking. Managerial ownership is associated with high risk-taking at low and high levels of managerial ownership while at intermediate level, managerial ownership has negative impact on bank risk-taking. Different types of ownership of banks in Pakistan have different impact on risk-taking. While government, family and institutional ownership have a positive impact on bank risk-taking, foreign ownership has a negative impact on bank risk-taking. Furthermore, the results show that capital regulations are important in influencing bank risk-taking with regard to higher ownership concentration. The findings of this paper suggest that the relation between bank risk-taking and capital regulations typically depends on the type of ownership.
引用
收藏
页码:185 / 209
页数:25
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