(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence

被引：4

作者：

Asako, Yasushi ^{[1
]}

Funaki, Yukihiko ^{[1
]}

Ueda, Kozo ^{[1
]}

Uto, Nobuyuki ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Waseda Univ, Tokyo, Japan

[2] Hokuriku Univ, Kanazawa, Ishikawa, Japan

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2020年 / 110卷

关键词：

Riding bubbles; Crashes; Asymmetric information; Experiment; Clock game; ASSET MARKETS; PRICE BUBBLES; BEHAVIOR; CRASHES; MODEL; EXPECTATIONS; UNCERTAINTY; KNOWLEDGE; RISK;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jedc.2019.103744

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders' choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.

引用

页数：22

共 37 条

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