An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value

被引：10
作者：
Hart, S
机构：
[1] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Math, Ctr Study Rat, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
[2] Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Dept Econ, IL-91904 Jerusalem, Israel
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2005年 / 33卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1007/s00182-005-0204-x
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The Maschler-Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games is axiomatized, by means of a marginality axiom.
引用
收藏
页码：355 / 366
页数：12
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