House money effect;
Experimental methodology;
Tangibility;
Public goods;
Charitable giving;
Individual choice;
Altruism;
DICTATOR GAMES;
ENDOWMENT HETEROGENEITY;
PROPERTY-RIGHTS;
HOUSE MONEY;
FAIRNESS;
PREFERENCES;
ORIGIN;
ENTITLEMENTS;
SELFISH;
IMPACT;
D O I:
10.1007/s10683-011-9298-0
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Several papers have documented that when subjects play with standard laboratory "endowments" they make less self-interested choices than when they use money they have either earned through a laboratory task or brought from outside the lab. In the context of a charitable giving experiment we decompose this into two common artifacts of the laboratory: the intangibility of money (or experimental currency units) promised on a computer screen relative to cash in hand, and the distinct treatment of random "windfall" gains relative to earned money. While both effects are found to be significant in non-parametric tests, the former effect, which has been neglected in previous studies, has a stronger impact on total donations, while the latter effect has a greater impact on the probability of donating. These results have clear implications for experimental design, and also suggest that the availability of more abstract payment methods may increase other-regarding behavior in the field.