Cognitive Reflection and Moral Reasoning

被引:2
作者
Prorokovic, Ana [1 ]
Gregov, Ljiljana [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Zadar, Dept Psychol, Kresimirova Obala 2, Zadar 23000, Croatia
关键词
cognitive reflection test; moral reasoning; reflectivity; impulsivity; dual process model; STYLES; RISK;
D O I
10.5709/acp-0356-y
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
The goal of this study was to examine the relationship between reflectivity/impulsivity and aspects of moral reasoning (general level and individual stages) while considering assessment times and relevance of moral arguments. The study involved 442 participants (163 female and 279 male) aged between 19 and 76, with different levels of education. The study was conducted online and two measuring instruments were applied: the cognitive reflection test and the test of moral reasoning The obtained results showed that problem solving time was significantly shorter for intuitive answers as opposed to correct answers. Predominantly reflective and predominantly impulsive individuals differed in various aspects concerning problem solving and the assessment of moral arguments. Predominantly impulsive individuals demonstrated: significantly longer problem solving time for correct answers (there were no differences for intuitive answers), lower general level of moral reasoning, longer assessment time, and higher assessment of the relevance of moral arguments (sensitivity to argument strength) in almost all stages of moral development. The results suggest that there are different ways in which dominant cognitive styles determine the effects in tasks of different types.
引用
收藏
页码:122 / 131
页数:10
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