Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and forced CEO turnover

被引：11
|
作者：
Zhong, Ruohan [1 ]
Li, Yanxi [1 ]
Wang, Yun [2 ]
机构：
[1] Dalian Univ Technol, 2 Linggong Rd, Dalian 116024, Peoples R China
[2] Zhejiang Gongshang Univ, 18 Xuezheng St, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China
来源：
EMERGING MARKETS REVIEW | 2021年 / 48卷
关键词：
Forced CEO turnover; Multiple large shareholders; Ownership identity; Control contests; FIRM PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT TURNOVER; CORPORATE-OWNERSHIP; EXECUTIVE TURNOVER; GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS; INVESTMENT; BENEFITS; MARKET; POWER;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ememar.2021.100816
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Using manually collected data of Chinese listed non-financial corporations, we find that multiple large shareholders (MLS) inhibit performance sensitivity to forced CEO turnover and are unrelated to forced CEO turnover-integrity sensitivity. The similar identities fail to affect the relationship between MLS and forced turnover-performance sensitivity. The results illustrate that the reduced performance sensitivity to forced turnover stems from the controlling coalition of MLS in emerging economies. The equity balance, large shareholders' size, and the absence of controlling shareholders can escalate the inhibiting effect of MLS. State-owned ownership mitigates the inhibiting role of MLS through political governance.
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收藏
页数：25
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