Money is privacy

被引:55
作者
Kahn, CM
McAndrews, J
Roberds, W
机构
[1] Fed Reserve Bank Atlanta, Dept Res, Atlanta, GA 30309 USA
[2] Fed Reserve Bank New York, Dept Res, New York, NY 10045 USA
[3] Univ Illinois, Dept Finance, Chicago, IL 60680 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2005.00323.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record-keeping device. Money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly, and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information and thus the cost of credit-based transactions continues to fall. In this article we investigate another use for money, the provision of privacy. That is, a money purchase does not identify the purchaser, whereas a credit purchase does. In a simple trading economy with moral hazard, we compare the efficiency of money and credit, and find that money may be useful even when information is free.
引用
收藏
页码:377 / 399
页数:23
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