Competition, formal governance and trust in alliances: An experimental study

被引:4
|
作者
Solinas, Giulia [1 ]
Meloso, Debrah [2 ]
Banal-Estanol, Albert [3 ,4 ]
Seldeslachts, Jo [5 ,6 ]
Kretschmer, Tobias [1 ,7 ,8 ]
机构
[1] Ludwig Maximilians Univ Munchen, ISTO, Munich, Germany
[2] TBS Business Sch, Dept Finance & Econ, Toulouse, France
[3] Univ Pompeu Fabra, Dept Econ & Business, Barcelona, Spain
[4] City Univ London, Dept Econ, London, England
[5] Katholieke Univ Leuven, DIW Berlin, Leuven, Belgium
[6] Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[7] Ludwig Maximilians Univ Munchen, Org Res Grp, Munich, Germany
[8] Ctr Econ Policy Res CEPR, London, England
关键词
Strategic alliances; Lab experiment; Alliance dynamics; Forgiveness; Stability; STRATEGIC ALLIANCES; INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS; RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE; MULTIPARTY ALLIANCES; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; COOPERATION; CONTRACTS; COORDINATION; FORGIVENESS; COLLABORATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.lrp.2022.102240
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the role of alliance governance in the behavior of partners in alliances with different degrees of competition. Using data from a lab experiment on 1,009 alliances and 31,662 partners' choices, we explore whether and how alliances succeed in different competitive scenarios, contingent on the use of formal governance mechanisms (termination clauses) and the number of partners in the alliance. We find that trust, an informal governance mechanism, emerges as a complement to formal governance in order to establish success in our experimental alliances, especially when competition is high. In particular, we document the significance of "trustbuilding" in initial stages and "trust repair" in later stages of our experimental alliances.
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页数:18
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