Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice

被引:375
作者
Dranove, David [1 ]
Jin, Ginger Zhe [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
REPORT CARDS; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; CONSUMER CHOICE; INFORMATION; ACCOUNTABILITY; INCENTIVES; MARKETS; LEMONS; PERFORMANCE;
D O I
10.1257/jel.48.4.935
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification. After comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure, we address two sets of theoretical issues. First, why don't sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of "unraveling" and, given the lack of unraveling, is it desirable to mandate seller disclosure? Second, when we rely on certifiers to act as the intermediary of quality disclosure, do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information? We further review empirical evidence on these issues, with a particular focus on healthcare, education, and finance. The empirical review covers quality measurement, the effect of third-party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior, as well as the economics of certifiers. (JEL D18, K32, L15, M31)
引用
收藏
页码:935 / 963
页数:29
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