COMPLEMENTARY CURRENCIES AS A SOCIO-TECHNICAL INNOVATION Evidence from a Local Clearing Union in Italy

被引:2
作者
Fama, Marco [1 ]
Musolino, Elena [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calabria, Arcavacata Di Rende, Italy
[2] Univ Bergamo, Sociol, Bergamo, Italy
关键词
Complementary Currencies; Local Clearing Unions; LINX; Money; Mutual Credit Systems; COMMUNITY CURRENCIES; MONEY; INSTITUTIONS;
D O I
10.1285/i20356609v13i1p462
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The paper points out the importance of considering how the technical solutions adopted in the development of a complementary currency (CC) are related to all the other ingredients required for the establishment of a monetary institution. In particular, the authors aim to shed light on the social implications deriving from the choice to adopt a specific monetary architecture, and how this choice interacts with the other institutional conditions of economic transactions. In doing so, they present the results of empirical research on a clearing-based currency project, showing that monetary tools are likely to produce effects which, far from being a smooth projection of pre-existing social dynamics, are the result of a dialectical process that is also influenced by the way they are technically designed. Even in the case of top-down CC projects, new forms of sociality can emerge from a process of "learning by doing", where monetary innovations serve as a laboratory allowing its users to experiment new ways of combining social and economic interactions. For this to happen, currency projects must be sustained by a whole set of relational, educational and economic resources, but the way they are technically designed deeply affect the conditions required for their institutionalisation.
引用
收藏
页码:462 / 486
页数:25
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