Traceback for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging

被引:16
作者
Tyagi, Nirvan [1 ]
Miers, Ian [2 ,3 ]
Ristenpart, Thomas [2 ]
机构
[1] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
[2] Cornell Tech, New York, NY USA
[3] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (CCS'19) | 2019年
关键词
D O I
10.1145/3319535.3354243
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Messaging systems are used to spread misinformation and other malicious content, often with dire consequences. End-to-end encryption improves privacy but hinders content-based moderation and, in particular, obfuscates the original source of malicious content. We introduce the idea of message traceback, a new cryptographic approach that enables platforms to simultaneously provide end-to-end encryption while also being able to track down the source of malicious content reported by users. We formalize functionality and security goals for message traceback, and detail two constructions that allow revealing a chain of forwarded messages (path traceback) or the entire forwarding tree (tree traceback). We implement and evaluate prototypes of our traceback schemes to highlight their practicality, and provide a discussion of deployment considerations.
引用
收藏
页码:413 / 430
页数:18
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