Does trust matter for R&D cooperation? A game theoretic examination

被引:14
作者
Cabon-Dhersin, ML
Ramani, SV
机构
[1] Ecole Natl Super Arts & Metiers, Grp Rech Risque Informat & Decis, Maison Rech ESTP, F-94230 Cachan, France
[2] Univ Pierre Mendes France, INRA, F-38070 Grenoble, France
关键词
non-cooperative game; R&D cooperation; trust and opportunism;
D O I
10.1007/s11238-004-3673-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, it identifies the trust conditions under which firms initiate R&D alliances and contribute to their success. The higher the spillovers, the higher the level of trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists.
引用
收藏
页码:143 / 180
页数:38
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