Physical Layer Identification Based on Spatial-Temporal Beam Features for Millimeter-Wave Wireless Networks

被引:38
作者
Balakrishnan, Sarankumar [1 ]
Gupta, Shreya [1 ]
Bhuyan, Arupjyoti [2 ]
Wang, Pu [3 ]
Koutsonikolas, Dimitrios [4 ]
Sun, Zhi [1 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Buffalo, Dept Elect Engn, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
[2] Idaho Natl Lab, Idaho Falls, ID 83402 USA
[3] Univ North Carolina, Dept Comp Sci, Charlotte, NC 28223 USA
[4] SUNY Buffalo, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA
关键词
Antenna arrays; Security; Feature extraction; Radio frequency; Wireless networks; Performance evaluation; Millimeter wave; physical layer security; RF fingerprinting; 80211ad; ay; 5G-NR; ATTACKS;
D O I
10.1109/TIFS.2019.2948283
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
With millimeter wave (mmWave) wireless communication envisioned to be the key enabler of next generation high data rate wireless networks, security is of paramount importance. While conventional security measures in wireless networks operate at a higher layer of the protocol stack, physical layer security utilizes unique device dependent hardware features to identify and authenticate legitimate devices. In this work, we identify that the manufacturing tolerances in the antenna arrays used in mmWave devices contribute to a beam pattern that is unique to each device, and to that end we propose a novel device fingerprinting scheme based on the unique beam pattern of different codebooks used by the mmWave devices. Specifically, we propose a fingerprinting scheme with multiple access points (APs) to take advantage of the rich spatial-temporal information of the beam pattern. We perform comprehensive experiments with commercial off-the-shelf mmWave devices to validate the reliability performance of our proposed method under various scenarios. We also compare our beam pattern feature with a conventional physical layer feature namely power spectral density feature (PSD). To that end, we implement PSD feature based fingerprinting for mmWave devices. We show that the proposed multiple APs scheme is able to achieve over 99% identification accuracy for stationary LOS and NLOS scenarios and significantly outperform the PSD feature fingerprinting method. For mobility scenario, the overall identification accuracy is 99%. In addition, we perform security analysis of our proposed beam pattern fingerprinting system and PSD fingerprinting system by studying the feasibility of performing impersonation attacks. We design and implement an impersonation attack mechanism for mmWave wireless networks using state-of-the-art 60 GHz software defined radios. We discuss our findings and their implications on the security of the mmWave wireless networks.
引用
收藏
页码:1831 / 1845
页数:15
相关论文
共 31 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], RO3000 SERIES HIGH F
[2]  
[Anonymous], 80211151150R0 IEEE
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2009, PROC JWIS
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2018, IEEE VTS VEH TECHNOL
[5]  
[Anonymous], WI FI ALL PUBL 2018
[6]  
[Anonymous], COMSOL MULT V5 2A
[7]  
[Anonymous], 2015, Tech. Rep.
[8]  
[Anonymous], 2012, 80211AD2012 IEEE
[9]  
[Anonymous], IEEE 802 11 TGAY USE
[10]  
Braun S, 2017, EUR SIGNAL PR CONF, P548, DOI 10.23919/EUSIPCO.2017.8081267