Abatement costs of post-Kyoto climate regimes

被引:57
作者
den Elzen, M [1 ]
Lucas, P [1 ]
van Vuuren, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Natl Inst Publ Hlth & Environm, NL-3720 BA Bilthoven, Netherlands
关键词
future commitments; abatement costs; emissions trading;
D O I
10.1016/j.enpol.2004.04.012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article analyses the abatement costs of three post-Kyoto regimes for differentiating commitments compatible with stabilising atmospheric greenhouse gases concentrations at 550ppmv CO2 equivalent in 2100. The three regimes explored are: (1) the Multi-Stage approach assumes a gradual increase in the number of Parties involved who are adopting either emission intensity or reductions targets; (2) the Brazilian Proposal approach, i.e. the allocation or reductions based on countries' contribution to temperature increase; (3) Contraction & Convergence, with full participation in convergence of per capita emission allowances. In 2050, the global costs increase up to about 1% of the world GDP, ranging from 0.5% to 1.5%, depending on baseline scenario and marginal abatement costs. Four groups of regions can be identified on the basis of similar costs (expressed as the percentage of GDP). These are: (1) OECD regions with average costs; (2) FSU, the Middle East and Latin America with high costs; (3) South-East Asia and East Asia (incl. China) with low costs;, and (4) South Asia (incl. India) and Africa with net gains from emissions trading for most regimes. The Brazilian Proposal approach gives the highest costs for groups 1 and 2. The distribution of costs for the Contraction & Convergence approach highly depends on the convergence year. The Multi-Stage approach and Contraction & Convergence (convergence year 2050) seem to result in relatively the most even distribution of costs amongst all Parties. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:2138 / 2151
页数:14
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