Vertical foreclosure versus downstream competition with capital precommitment

被引：5

作者：

Baake, P

Kamecke, U

Normann, HT ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ London Royal Holloway & Bedford New Coll, Dept Econ, Egham TW20 0EX, Surrey, England

[2] Humboldt Univ, Dept Econ, D-10178 Berlin, Germany

[3] Ifo Inst Econ Res, D-81679 Munich, Germany

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2004年 / 22卷 / 02期

关键词：

foreclosure; commitment; vertical restraints;

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00125-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The recent literature on vertical foreclosure suggests that vertical integration can have the anticompetitive effect of enabling an upstream firm to commit to restricting output to downstream firms at the monopoly level. We allow the upstream firm to make an ex-ante capital precommitment. We show that, if integration is outlawed, the upstream firm will distort capital downward as an alternative device to restrict output. We show that this alternative may be socially less efficient than vertical integration. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：185 / 192

页数：8

共 17 条

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