Working well with others: The evolution of teamwork and ethics

被引:10
作者
Arce, DG
Gunn, LB
机构
[1] Rhodes Coll, Memphis, TN 38112 USA
[2] FTN Financial Structured Finance, Memphis, TN 38117 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s11127-005-7523-0
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In non-hierarchical environments such as teams and honor codes, effective self-management requires members to simultaneously address their dual roles as worker (agent) and monitor (principal). We employ an evolutionary analysis of teamwork where ethical behavior is voluntary, repetitive and related to an established norm. The explicit recognition of monitor-worker duality results in a unique and intuitive social contract that specifies the punishment must fit the crime. Our results are consistent with examples of successful team production, unraveling honor codes at colleges and teamwork and ethics as part of the MBA curriculum.
引用
收藏
页码:115 / 131
页数:17
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