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Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus
被引:130
|作者:
Kuhfuss, Laure
[1
]
Preget, Raphaele
[2
]
Thoyer, Sophie
[3
]
Hanley, Nick
[1
]
机构:
[1] Univ St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AJ, Fife, Scotland
[2] INRA, UMR LAMETA 1135, Montpellier, France
[3] Montpellier Supagro UMR LAMETA 1135, Montpellier, France
关键词:
payment for environmental services;
choice experiment;
collective incentive;
social norm;
behavioural economics;
AGGLOMERATION BONUS;
SELECTION BIAS;
CHOICE;
WILLINGNESS;
CONSERVATION;
PARTICIPATE;
PROVISION;
DESIGN;
DETERMINANTS;
INFORMATION;
D O I:
10.1093/erae/jbv031
中图分类号:
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
020205 ;
1203 ;
摘要:
This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers' participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others' participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.
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页码:609 / 636
页数:28
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