Differences in bank and microfinance business models: An analysis of the loan monitoring systems and funding sources

被引:12
作者
Uddin, Md Hamid [1 ]
Akter, Shabiha [2 ]
Mollah, Sabur [3 ]
Al Mahi, Masnun [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Southampton, Malaysia Campus, Iskandar Puteri, Johor, Malaysia
[2] East West Univ, Dept Business Adm, Dhaka, Bangladesh
[3] Univ Sheffield, Sheffield Univ Management Sch, Sheffield, England
[4] Univ Liberal Arts Bangladesh ULAB, Dhaka, Bangladesh
关键词
Microfinance institutions; Banks; Business models; Financial intermediation; Core functions; Comparative analysis; PANEL-DATA; QUANTILE REGRESSION; NONINTEREST INCOME; CAPITAL BUFFERS; CREDIT; PERFORMANCE; RISK; INSTITUTIONS; SUPERVISION; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.1016/j.intfin.2022.101644
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) use an alternative financial intermediation system (business model) to offer banking services for the marginal people where collateral-based conventional banking has not been effective. They facilitate collateral-free lending through close loan moni-toring and possess a distinct capability to collect savings via donations (besides deposits). We assert that the unique intermediation model presents MFIs with a lower credit risk; however, that comes at the cost of higher business risk. We provide empirical support for our argument by analyzing a broad cross-country dataset comprising banks and MFIs from 68 countries. We show that MFIs maintain a lower non-performing loan ratio but retain higher cash and capital ratios and a smaller deposit ratio than banks. We provide insights into the areas of variation between two dissimilar models for financial intermediation, associated risks, and prospects for integrating them within a common regulatory framework.
引用
收藏
页数:26
相关论文
共 103 条
[41]   FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND DELEGATED MONITORING [J].
DIAMOND, DW .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) :393-414
[42]  
Dorfleitner G, 2017, Q REV ECON FINANC, V65, P1, DOI 10.1016/j.qref.2016.06.005
[43]   Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information [J].
Galariotis, Emilios ;
Villa, Christophe ;
Yusupov, Nurmukhammad .
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, 2011, 47 (09) :1371-1390
[44]  
Gallardo J., 2005, Savings and Development, V29, P85
[45]   Microfinance Institutions Fostering Sustainable Development by Region [J].
Garcia-Perez, Iciar ;
Angeles Fernandez-Izquierdo, Maria ;
Jesus Munoz-Torres, Maria .
SUSTAINABILITY, 2020, 12 (07)
[46]   CAPITAL CONTROLS AND BANK RISK [J].
GENNOTTE, G ;
PYLE, D .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 1991, 15 (4-5) :805-824
[47]   Individualism-collectivism and group creativity [J].
Goncalo, Jack A. ;
Staw, Barry M. .
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, 2006, 100 (01) :96-109
[48]  
Gonzalez A, 2009, MIX DATA BRIEF
[49]   Performance of Microfinance Institutions: Does Government Ideology Matter? [J].
Gui, Ferdinand A. ;
Fodder, Jyotirmoy ;
Shahriar, Abu Zafar M. .
WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 2017, 100 :1-15
[50]   Cooperatives as information machines: German rural credit cooperatives, 1883-1914 [J].
Guinnane, TW .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, 2001, 61 (02) :366-389