Dynamic model making for iterated prisoner's dilemma based on Markov chain

被引：0

作者：

Liang, Peng ^{[1
]}

Haiyun, Liu ^{[1
]}

Weibing, Liu ^{[2
]}

Xianjia, Wang ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China

[2] Wuhan Univ, Inst Syst Engn, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China

来源：

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH CHINESE CONTROL CONFERENCE, VOL 6 | 2007年

关键词：

evolutionary game; prisoner's dilemma; Markov chain; nash equilibrium; evolutionary stable strategy;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

Consider the bounded rationality of players in evolutionary games and the character of Markov chain, this paper presented a dynamic model for iterated prisoner's dilemma game. In this model, strategies choosing of players was mapped to a Markov decision process with two states, and this model can successfully simulate strategies choosing and learning of players. It can be used not only in finite populations but also in infinite populations.

引用

页码：294 / +

页数：2

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