Truth-revealing mechanisms for courts

被引:12
作者
Cooter, R
Emons, W
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Sch Law, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Bern, Dept Econ, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
来源
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 2003年 / 159卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1628/0932456032974835
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truth-revealing mechanism. Moreover, we develop a truth-revealing mechanism for the same set of restrictions under which perjury rules operate. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually finds that the testimony was incorrect; the court need not determine that testimony was dishonest. We explain how truth-revealing mechanisms could combat distortions of observations by factual witnesses and exaggerations by experts, including "junk science.".
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 279
页数:21
相关论文
共 24 条
[21]  
SANCHIRICO CW, 2001, AM LAW EC REV, V16, P320
[22]   Adversarial and inquisitorial procedures in arbitration [J].
Shin, HS .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1998, 29 (02) :378-405
[23]  
Slottje Daniel J., 1999, The Role of the Academic Economist in Litigation Support
[24]   The economist in tort litigation [J].
Thornton, R ;
Ward, J .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1999, 13 (02) :101-112