Truth-revealing mechanisms for courts

被引:12
作者
Cooter, R
Emons, W
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Sch Law, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Bern, Dept Econ, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
来源
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT | 2003年 / 159卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1628/0932456032974835
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truth-revealing mechanism. Moreover, we develop a truth-revealing mechanism for the same set of restrictions under which perjury rules operate. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually finds that the testimony was incorrect; the court need not determine that testimony was dishonest. We explain how truth-revealing mechanisms could combat distortions of observations by factual witnesses and exaggerations by experts, including "junk science.".
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 279
页数:21
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