Ex post information rents in sequential screening

被引：21

作者：

Kraehmer, Daniel ^{[1
]}

Strausz, Roland ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bonn, Inst Microecon, Dept Econ, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

[2] Humboldt Univ, Inst Econ Theory 1, D-10178 Berlin, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2015年 / 90卷

关键词：

Information rents; Sequential screening; Information disclosure; CONTRACTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：257 / 273

页数：17

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